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Download The Philosophy of Science (Oxford Readings in Philosophy) ePub

by David Papineau

Download The Philosophy of Science (Oxford Readings in Philosophy) ePub
  • ISBN 0198751648
  • ISBN13 978-0198751649
  • Language English
  • Author David Papineau
  • Publisher Oxford University Press (August 22, 1996)
  • Pages 352
  • Formats mobi lrf azw lrf
  • Category Different
  • Subcategory Humanities
  • Size ePub 1505 kb
  • Size Fb2 1604 kb
  • Rating: 4.3
  • Votes: 637

The aim of this series is to bring together important recent writings in major areas of philosophical inquiry, selected from a variety of sources, mostly periodicals, which may not be conveniently available to the university student or the general reader. The editor of each volume contributes an introductory essay on the items chosen and on the questions with which they deal. A selective bibliography is appended as a guide to further reading. The contributors ask whether we are justified in believing scientific theories and what attitude we should take to them if we are not. Although few philosophers seriously question the existence of everyday objects like trees and tables, many have real doubts about viruses, electrons, and gravitational waves. The last two decades have seen important new work in the philosophy of science, stimulated by sceptical attitudes towards scientific theories. Scientific realist have in turn countered with arguments of their own, resulting in a wide-ranging debate drawing from many different philosophical disciplines. The Philosophy of Science bridges the gap between both sides of the argument, including articles on different species of realism and anti-realism, the underdetermination of theory by evidence, the lessons of the history of science, naturalized epistemology of science, and Bayesian methodology. This book is intended for undergraduate and graduate students studying the philosophy of science, and scholars with an interest in the subject.

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The Philosophy of Science book. The Philosophy of Science. Oxford Readings in Philosophy). He received a BSc in mathematics from the University of Natal and a BA and PhD in philosophy from the University of Cambridge under the supervision of Ian Hacking. He has worked in metaphysics, epistemology, and the philosophies of science, mind, and mathematics.

new theories either incorporate old equations (the only example is Fresnel/Maxwell) or yield them as limiting cases of new ones (of.

Philosophy of Science. Social and Political Philosophy. Part II covers what are considered to be the traditional topics in the philosophy of science such as causation, probability, models, ethics and values, and explanation.

The Philosophy of Science. The newest addition to the successful Oxford Readings in Philosophy series, The Philosophy of Science contains the most important contributions to the recent philosophical debate on the authority of scientific theory. Oxford Readings in Philosophy. The contributors ask whether we are justified in believing scientific theories and what attitude we should take to them if we are not.

The newest addition to the successful Oxford Readings in Philosophy series, this collection contains the most important contributions to the recent debate on the philosophy of science. The contributors crystallize the often heated arguments of the last two decades, assessing the skeptical attitudes within philosophy of science and the counter-challenges of the scientific realists. Contributors include Nancy Cartwright, Brian Ellis, Arthur Fine, Clark Glymour, Larry Laudan, Peter Lipton, Alan Musgrave, Wesely C. Salmon, Lawrence Sklar, Bas C. van Fraassen, and John Worrall.

ISBN 10: 0198751648 ISBN 13: 9780198751649.

Primary Texts (Books). Brouwer - Cambridge Lectures on Intuitionism. Richard Dedekind - Essays on the Theory of Numbers. Gottlob Frege - Grundlagen der Arithmetik or The Foundations of Arithmetic.

The journal publishes work that uses.

The journal publishes work that uses philosophical methods in addressing issues raised in the natural and human sciences

That's right, all we need is the price of a paperback book to sustain a non-profit library the whole world depends o.

That's right, all we need is the price of a paperback book to sustain a non-profit library the whole world depends o. Introductory: Nature and function of the philosophy of science, May Brodbeck - Scientific outlook : naturalism and humanism, Herbert Feigl - I. The nature of scientific method: Does science have metaphysical presuppositions? - - Arthur Pap - Logic of modern physics, P. W. Bridgman - Testability and meaning, Rudolf Carnap - Verifiability theory of meaning, Hans Reichenbach - Logic of psychophysical measurement, Gustave Bergmann and Kenneth W. Spence - II.

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Fine and Musgrave on the natural ontological attitude. Fine: Realism is a natural attitude, but this owes nothing to the following two things which philosophers have compounded with it: (1) the idea that across "revolutions" there is a steady progress towards truth and a continuity in the objects studied; (2) elaborate philosophical explications of what truth really means and in what sense electrons and such are really out there in the objective, external world. Musgrave: (2) is a straw man: realists don't really have any sophisticated theories for these things; they are happy with the naive correspondence theory which Fine accepts.

Lipton. Antirealist: Suppose that scientists can reliably rank any set of theories with respect to truth. Even with this generous assumption one could not infer that the best theory is true, for the truth may be among those theories not considered. Realist: with this assumption one could easily produce many truths by applying it to P and not-P. Antirealist: But if P is scientifically interesting then not-P is typically a worthless thing to know, so the "truths" produced in this way will be useless. Realist: now you have changed your principled argument into an empirical claim (that scientists will choose mostly not-P's), which is, moreover, false, when we let P be any well-established fact of current science. So far so good, but now Lipton heedlessly adds the supposed death-blow that since ranking depends on already accepted theories, reliable ranking in fact implies (why? how? Lipton doesn't say) probable approximate truth of these background theories.

Worrall's "structural realism" makes two claims: (1) the "real" part of a scientific theory is its structure, which is equated with its mathematical equations in order to support the claim that (2) science is continuous at this level, i.e., new theories either incorporate old equations (the only example is Fresnel/Maxwell) or yield them as limiting cases of new ones (of which there is also only one example (relativity theory) despite this case being allegedly "much more common" (p. 160)). Worrall has thus cooked up a "realism" which is: (a) based on ad hoc, post factum induction on two cases, (b) much too feeble to support a no miracles argument, (c) falsified (e.g. Ptolemy/Copernicus/Kepler), (d) deceptively ascribed to Poincaré, who in fact claimed neither (1) nor (2).