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Download Effective Intentions: The Power of Conscious Will ePub

by Alfred R. Mele

Download Effective Intentions: The Power of Conscious Will ePub
  • ISBN 0199764689
  • ISBN13 978-0199764686
  • Language English
  • Author Alfred R. Mele
  • Publisher Oxford University Press; Reprint edition (November 11, 2010)
  • Pages 208
  • Formats mobi lit mobi lit
  • Category Different
  • Subcategory Social Sciences
  • Size ePub 1106 kb
  • Size Fb2 1119 kb
  • Rating: 4.4
  • Votes: 347

Each of the following claims has been defended in the scientific literature on free will and consciousness: your brain routinely decides what you will do before you become conscious of its decision; there is only a 100 millisecond window of opportunity for free will, and all it can do is veto conscious decisions, intentions, or urges; intentions never play a role in producing corresponding actions; and free will is an illusion. In Effective Intentions Alfred Mele shows that the evidence offered to support these claims is sorely deficient. He also shows that there is strong empirical support for the thesis that some conscious decisions and intentions have a genuine place in causal explanations of corresponding actions. In short, there is weighty evidence of the existence of effective conscious intentions or the power of conscious will. Mele examines the accuracy of subjects' reports about when they first became aware of decisions or intentions in laboratory settings and develops some implications of warranted skepticism about the accuracy of these reports. In addition, he explores such questions as whether we must be conscious of all of our intentions and why scientists disagree about this. Mele's final chapter closes with a discussion of imaginary scientific findings that would warrant bold claims about free will and consciousness of the sort he examines in this book.

Find books In short, there is weighty evidence of the existence of effective conscious intentions or the power of conscious will.

In Effective Intentions Alfred Mele shows that the evidence offered to support these claims is sorely deficient. He also shows that there is strong empirical support for the thesis that some conscious decisions and intentions have a genuine place in causal explanations of corresponding actions. In short, there is weighty evidence of the existence of effective conscious intentions or the power of conscious will

Alfred R. Mele is William H. and Lucyle T. Werkmeister Professor of Philosophy at Florida State University

Alfred R. Werkmeister Professor of Philosophy at Florida State University. Considerable media attention has recently been devoted to attacks on the power of conscious will based on the neurophysiological experiments of Benjamin Libet and the psychological observations of Daniel Wegner. The "willusionists", as they have been dubbed by philosopher Eddy Nahmias, argue that conscious will has no causal power, but is merely an illusory impression constructed after the event. In November 2007, while I was working on this book, I received the following e-mail message from someone I don’t know. In short, there is weighty evidence of the existence of effective conscious intentions or the power of conscious will. Dear Dr. Mele, I recently purchased a DVD by Dr. Stephen Wolinsk. .

PDF This book has both a negative aim and a positive ai. Illusion of Conscious Will 91. 6. Proximal Intentions and Awareness Reports 117.

PDF This book has both a negative aim and a positive aim. The negative aim is to show that some recent influential scientific claims about free will,. 7. The Power of Conscious Will 131. 8. Conclusion 145. References 163.

Each of the following claims has been defended in the scientific literature on free will and consciousness: your brain routinely decides what you will do before you become conscious of its decision; there is only a 100 millisecond window of opportunity for free will, and all it can do is veto conscious decisions, intentions, or urges; intentions never play a role in producing. corresponding actions; and free will is an illusion. In Effective Intentions Alfred Mele shows that the evidence offered to support these claims is sorely deficient.

Another respect in which Meles discussion of intentions might be questioned concerns the issue whether intentions have to be conscious

Another respect in which Meles discussion of intentions might be questioned concerns the issue whether intentions have to be conscious Suppose some intention to be conscious, there may still remain a question as to whether its being conscious is a causally efficacious factor. At least I think this question remains, although if intentions have to be conscious there would seem to be no counterfactual foil, in which the intention would still have brought about the action without being conscious. In his penultimate chapter (Ch.

This book has both a negative aim and a positive aim. The negative aim is to show that some recent influential scientific claims about free will, consciousness, and actionproduction are not warranted by the data. The negative aim is to show that some recent influential scientific claims about free will, consciousness, and actionproduction are not warranted by the data

Alfred Remen Mele is an American philosopher and the William H. He is also the past Director of the Philosophy and Science of Self-Control Project (2014-2017) and the Big.

Alfred Remen Mele is an American philosopher and the William H. He is also the past Director of the Philosophy and Science of Self-Control Project (2014-2017) and the Big Questions in Free Will Project (2010-2013). Mele is the author of twelve books and over 200 articles. Mele attended Wayne State University and received his doctorate in philosophy from the University of Michigan in 1979.

Keywords: Effective Intentions, Willby Alfred, Conscious Willby, Mele, Power.

Talk about Effective Intentions: The Power of Conscious Will


Fegelv
As a bit of a neophyte to matters concerning the philosophy of the mind, I found this book a bit challenging to work through. However, the content is clear, reflective, and mind expanding.

The overarching theme of the book seems to be an analysis of what is meant conceptually when we refer to "intentions" (conscious or otherwise). Mele handled the material adeptly. I found the illustrations and thought experiments he provides to be particularly helpful in understanding difficult concepts. For example, the idea that subjects of Libet-like studies may well be consciously priming themselves to make a decision when they say "now" in their minds or how we may well intend to do things unconsciously, such as utilize turn signals when driving. Mele also elucidates interesting insights into concepts surrounding consciousness, such as considerations on the timing of conscious awareness, as well as providing a particularly clear description of the terms surrounding the conflicting opinions concerning free will.

In addition to the conceptual analysis of intention and consciousness, Mele also takes to task the carelessness with which some thinkers have approached data obtained from Libet style experiments. Given Mele's analysis, it seems unambiguously clear that the conclusions to be drawn from the results of such experiments are clearly ambiguous.

All in all, this is probably not a recommended book for a beginner, but it is a good read for those who possess some familiarity with the subject matter or are willing to stick it out. I spent a lot of time reading the same sentences over and over and over again before the content really sank in, but that mostly had to do with my lack of familiarity with the topic.
Kulalas
Considerable media attention has recently been devoted to attacks on the power of conscious will based on the neurophysiological experiments of Benjamin Libet and the psychological observations of Daniel Wegner. The "willusionists", as they have been dubbed by philosopher Eddy Nahmias, argue that conscious will has no causal power, but is merely an illusory impression constructed after the event.

Alfred Mele is a philosopher specializing in free will, who is well informed about the neurophysiological and psychological literature. In this book he convincingly refutes the claims of the willusionists, showing that their most striking claims depend on naïve conceptions of free will and human agency. His focus is mainly philosophical, but he does also address difficulties at the level of the scientific experiments.

This is an important contribution to the debate. It is not light bedtime reading for the casual reader, but will repay serious study.