Download Spec Ops: Case Studies in Special Operations Warfare : Theory and Practice ePub

This study is what it is, and one can hardly find fault with its place in history. If you're one of the people who knows you ought to read it, you don't need this review. For everyone else, just so you understand:
- Ignore the publishing date. This is McRaven's 1993 NPS thesis (as an O-5 Commander), so it's quite dated even in his own career. In fact as the description notes, its cases are from 1940-45, 1970, and 1976. (Yes, he does not do Operation Eagle Claw.)
- I'll highlight that again: this is a Naval Postgraduate School thesis. It's written like one, so I hope you like that.
- McRaven is a SEAL, and "Spec Ops" to him means direct action. This book includes nothing about unconventional warfare or counterinsurgency, etc, and in fact his definition excludes these.
- If you're not sure if the book is for you, know that since this started as an NPS thesis, it's published for free by DTIC. I was happy to get the book for the referenceable format, but it may not be worth it to you.

I don't normally read military history. But after reading is book Make Your Bed, I wanted to learn more about a man that could command SEALs and run a university. The fact that his theory of special operation was derived inductively from 8 case studies most of which I had never heard of made the propects for interesting reading more likely. I found the style was concise and readable. I found myself caught up in the planning and layout of the operations, opening Google Maps constantly so I could imagine the terrain and envision myself alongside the forces engaged in these amazing operations. The experience was very satisfying. And the analysis McRaven provides for each case is helpful, seems right, and reinforcing each time it was repeated for each case. I came away awed by the intelligence and bravery of the men who executed these operations. I learned a lot about the history of the conflicts and about the cultures involved. Even if you don't think you'd like reading about war, I'd encourage you to try it. It is a long book and I thought I'd bog down....NOT AT ALL! War is not pretty, but these operations and the thought invested make it obvious that it is indeed not just a science but an art.

I liked the detailed description of the operations. Perhaps a little bit repetitive, but you have to accept that Admiral MacRaven is presenting not only a history of notable special operations, but also trying to develop a military theory of those operations.
I was impressed by the bravery, sacrifice and resourcefulness of men from several countries (Germans, british, italians, americans) who carried those operations. In some cases, the brilliant improvisation. And the superb planning of the successful ones.
Fascinating. Very good.

I give this five stars for its clarity, mutually consistent concepts and relevance, but would give it many more.

Admiral McRaven, by published accounts, was a major player in planning the raid that Seal Team Six made on the Usama Bin Laden compound. Other reviewers have gone into more detail than I will, but four items from its conceptual toolkit are useful to my discussion, focused on the mutable character of war making. I will use two accounts about the Bin Laden raid to illustrate some points related to the Admiral's book.

In my lifetime, war making has changed from the "conventional" army operations of WW2 to the Cold War of regional military efforts, to this era of "terrorist" war making. I refuse to name this use of collateral damage by "special human/technical weapons" as a "war on terror." It is dependent on media coverage of carnage wrought on budgets generally smaller than for conventional wars. War is made on a specific adversary, not on a method. SPEC OPS preceded its practical importance by more than a decade, a tribute to a brilliant analyst.
1) McRaven's theory of special operations proposes "...a successful special operations defies conventional wisdom by using a small force to defeat a much larger or well-entrenched opponent."
2) The smaller force relies on precision, stealth and speed to achieve "strategic advantage of relative superiority."
3) McRaven defines special operations as "A special operation is conducted by forces specially trained, equipped, and supported for a specific target whose destruction, elimination, or rescue (in the case of hostages) is a political or military imperative."
4) The ruling idea is from General Carl von Clauswitz' "frictions of war" (chance, uncertainty and will of the enemy). This "friction" is an emergent property of the interactions of nonlinear outcomes from a number of sources in the combat arena. It would be helpful here to get and to read (if not already at hand) Clauswitz' "On War" to be familiar with his trinitarian analysis.

There are many books available on the Bin Laden raid. Each has a somewhat different account, according to published reviews. I have two of them: Mark Owen's "No Easy Day" and "SEAL Target Geronimo: The Inside Story of the Mission to Kill Osama bin Laden." Of the two, "SEAL Target" is the more credible account for me, as its described sequence of the raid near Abbottabad does not damage the "strategic advantage/relative superiority" of McRaven's planning by losing its stealth at the beginning with a helicopter crash. I commend you to McRaven's Figure 1-1 Sample Relative Superiority Graph. Its time line goes from "point of vulnerability" to six hours, with a radical change of risk at about 2.5 hours. As the remainder of the book explains, this is a complex type of multilevel systems undertaking based on competency with an amazing array of weapons, accurate intelligence (human and technical), courage and character (not necessarily in that order). Those who are members of elite military teams are aware of Murphy's Law. Or, as Clauswitz points out, "The greater the magnitude of any event, the wider the range of forces and circumstances that affect it." It is imperative to have creative backups to Plan A.

Bin Laden raid books are easily available for comparison of accounts of an event where some critical details will necessarily remain hidden. As Macchiavelli pointed out, "When little is known, much is suspected." Readers should examine various versions of the raid on Bin Laden in the light of learning about the budgeting and planning expenses of this species of "black operations" war. I am reminded of variations in some important official accounts in my lifetime, starting with the Eisenhower administration's handling of the Francis Gary Powers U2 incident, the Warren Commission Report on the assassination of President Kennedy, the Reagan Administration raid on Grenada* and now the current administration's accounts of the Bin Laden raid. The movie "Zero Dark Thirty" is not a subject of this review.

Stories groups craft to explain their actions may tell more about them than if they were transparent about their assertions. Mc Raven's book is a useful place to start to understand the "learning curve" that underlies a history of wars. This review would get even longer if I suggested more history of war or art/science of war books. But "SEAL Target Geronimo" recommends "The Book of Five Rings" or the Way of the Warrior by Miyamoto Musashi (translated by Jo Han-sun). "Leaders must exercise it, soldiers must know it. No one living really knows all there is to know about strategy."

*This raid was a textbook case of "Cold War geopolitical chess." Get out a map of the Caribbean and technical specs of MiG 23 aircraft in terms of flight radius with bases on eastern Cuba, El Salvador and finally, Grenada. With the third southern piece of the puzzle under Soviet control, economic and strategic shipping in the Caribbean and Panama Canal Zone could have been interdicted at will.

The topic of Spec Ops becomes controversial when you consider things like suicide attacks, as used by the Japanese in WWII or by Islamic extremists of today. And so while we can appreciate and even savor the German Spec Op rescue of Mussolini, for example, its not as easy to 'appreciate' the 9/11 attacks. There is a gulf in the military mind between well planned and executed special operations- compared to say, exploding a bomb in your shoe to bring down a commercial jet over a city. For that matter, its interesting to consider how the US use of drone strikes/kills fits into the framework of what is or isnt a special operation.

Its a complicated subject, and war is hell, but for the time being its good to know that such forward thinking men/soldiers as Bill McRaven are on our side.