derrierloisirs.fr
» » Blood, Sweat and Arrogance: And the Myth of Churchill's War (Phoenix Press)

Download Blood, Sweat and Arrogance: And the Myth of Churchill's War (Phoenix Press) ePub

by Gordon Corrigan

Download Blood, Sweat and Arrogance: And the Myth of Churchill's War (Phoenix Press) ePub
  • ISBN 0304367389
  • ISBN13 978-0304367382
  • Language English
  • Author Gordon Corrigan
  • Publisher Phoenix; New Ed edition (June 1, 2007)
  • Pages 496
  • Formats mbr doc lrf docx
  • Category History
  • Subcategory Military
  • Size ePub 1822 kb
  • Size Fb2 1870 kb
  • Rating: 4.1
  • Votes: 767

Why were the British, victorious in 1918, unable to match the Germans in 1940—and why were these pioneers of tank warfare overcome for so long by Germany’s panzers? This caustic critique exposes just how close England came to losing World War II, and in the process overturns the reputations of some of Britain’s most famous generals. Churchill takes heavy blame for the poor state of the British forces in 1939, while Montgomery is revealed to have much skill with a pen…but very little in command. It’s a brilliant, eye-opening reassessment, from policy decisions in the 1920s to the great campaigns of 1939-45.

I find Gordon Corrigan has done a masterful job of exploding the myths of Churchill, before and during WWII. That Churchill had no real combat experience may come as a surprise to many readers of this book.

I find Gordon Corrigan has done a masterful job of exploding the myths of Churchill, before and during WWII. How the British were hoodwinked by the German military in their rearmament program in the run-up to the war is presented in expert detail. The fact was, Chamberlain did want to rearm, but his view was stifled by public opinion. The history of a war is written by the victors.

Corrigan also peppers his narrative with an engrossing array of military knowledge. - Noble Frankland SPECTATOR 'Bracing, challenging and highly informative . TRIBUNE 'This is an excellent book, and I recommend it to anyone who has an interest in the Second World Wa.

Gordon Corrigan's Mud, Blood and Poppycock overturned the myths that surround the First World War. Now he challenges our assumptions about the Second World War in this brilliant, caustic narrative that exposes just how close Britain came to losing. He reveals how Winston Churchill bears a heavy responsibility for the state of our forces in 1939, and how his interference in military operations caused a string of disasters. The reputations of some of our most famous generals are also overturned: above all, Montgomery, whose post-war stature owes more to his skill with a pen than talent for.

Blood, Sweat and Arrogance book. Published June 1st 2007 by Phoenix (first published January 1st 2006). Blood, Sweat and Arrogance: And the Myth of Churchill's War. by. Gordon Corrigan. Blood, Sweat and Arrogance: And the Myth of Churchill's War (Phoenix Press). 0304367389 (ISBN13: 9780304367382).

Gordon Corrigan Churchill takes heavy blame for the poor state of the British forces in 1939.

Why were the British, victorious in 1918, unable to match the Germans in 1940-and why were these pioneers of tank warfare overcome for so long by Germany’s panzers? This caustic critique exposes just how close England came to losing World War II, and in the process overturns the reputations of some of Britain’s most famous generals. Churchill takes heavy blame for the poor state of the British forces in 1939, while Montgomery is revealed to have much skill with a pe. ut very little in command. It’s a brilliant, eye-opening reassessment, from policy decisions in the 1920s to the great campaigns of 1939-45.

Corrigan's first charge is that Churchill bore as much guilt as appeasers for . However, Corrigan's criticisms of Montgomery's arrogance, rudeness, dishonesty, and so on, are standard stuff.

Corrigan's first charge is that Churchill bore as much guilt as appeasers for Britain's military unreadiness in 1939 because he had supported the so-called "Ten Year Rule", whereby governments estimated that there would be no major war within a decade. The indictment is unsound. A number of Corrigan's strictures on Churchill as war leader are true but few are new. He remained a rogue elephant, a spiritual subaltern of hussars who craved to grapple with the enemy in person. He had tunnel vision yet was easily distracted by adventures.

Find many great new & used options and get the best deals for Blood, Sweat and Arrogance: The Myths of. .Ships from the UK. Former Library books. Shows some signs of wear, and may have some markings on the inside. 100% Money Back Guarantee. Read full description.

Ships from the UK. See details and exclusions.

his tone, occasionally sneering, often patronising and always cocksure, is particularly tiresome in someone so prone to error. He makes the elementary mistake of asserting, for example, that a Russian declaration of war against Japan "never came"

Talk about Blood, Sweat and Arrogance: And the Myth of Churchill's War (Phoenix Press)


Mr.Champions
I found this to be one of the more iconoclastic, caustic, and fascinating analyses of Britain's role and efforts in the Second World War.

Gordon Corrigan was a serving officer in the Gurkhas, so he has a military man's idea of the strengths and weaknesses of the army he served and culture that existed, well into his time -- he often refers to things that have not changed in the British military and political establishment. He writes with energy and intelligence, with a good deal of caustic wit.

I am not able to follow him completely on his primary theses: that Winston Churchill was an appalling military leader for Britain and that Field Marshal Montgomery -- that bane of American armchair historians -- was extremely overrated. Churchill did undertake some bizarre projects and had some bizarre ideas. But some of his moves were made to convince others, the Americans most notably, that Britain WOULD continue to fight, when all else seemed hopeless, and would support allies like Greece.

Montgomery's major failures were his inability to get along with his colleagues, his refusal to admit his mistakes, and writing self-serving memoirs that said everything he did went as planned. If he had not done that, he would have a higher reputation, particularly among Americans. Monty was operating with an army that was down to the end of its manpower, serving a country that was financially and economically bankrupt, its ethos and mentality shadowed by the horrors of the Great War.

He could not send morally exhausted soldiers of a democratic and bankrupt nation to perform the operational and tactical feats that Hitler and Stalin routinely expected out of their generals and soldiers. And, as we know, when Hitler's and Stalin's generals and troops failed, they faced gulags (if generals) and penal battalions (for all those below). The British merely sent less-competent generals to command training units in Scotland, and were reluctant to impose the death penalty on deserters after the experiences of the Somme.

However, Corrigan's books are well-researched, knowledgeable, well-written, and quite illuminating. I highly recommend this work, like his other ones, to the serious student of World War I and World War II.
Vijora
Probably the best book I've read about WWII and confirmed many of the things that I'd been told by my father, grandfather and great uncles.

The only real downside to the book is that the author intentionally limits its scope to the Western Europe and Mediterranean theaters and it's very Army- centric.

WIthout wishing to give too much away (as you should buy the book) by the middle of 1918, the British and Commonwealth Armies were superb all- arms fighting formations that comprehensively thrashed the German armies during the 100 day offensive. Having won the war, these armies were dismantled with indecent haste, the hard- learned lessons forgotten and our military technology development put off until tomorrow. The architect of a lot of this: Winston Spencer Churchill.

As the author points out, Neville Chamberlain was an early proponent of modernizing the armed forces and it was in fact Churchill who voted against the necessary upgrades until it was almost too late.

Overall, a great read. If Britain had still had the army of 1918 in 1939, WWII would have never happened.
Fohuginn
I knew when I started reading this book that other reviewers/Court Historians would blast away at the author. I was not surprised. I notice that every time an author does competent research into certain myths of British history, there will be a torrent of critical response from his readers. Not from me, if the facts are in order and the research has been property conducted. I find Gordon Corrigan has done a masterful job of exploding the myths of Churchill, before and during WWII. That Churchill had no real combat experience may come as a surprise to many readers of this book. How the British were hoodwinked by the German military in their rearmament program in the run-up to the war is presented in expert detail. The fact was, Chamberlain did want to rearm, but his view was stifled by public opinion.

The history of a war is written by the victors. After WWI, Stanley Baldwin said, "Winston has written a big book about himself and called it The Great War." Likewise, Churchill published his own history of WWII in six volumes and it was his own perception of it. By getting there first, he ensured that his interpretation of what happened and why it happened became the accepted version. So, anyone who disagreed was written off as an appeaser and incompetent. This is why there are many Court Historians of British history, who, brought up, on this time-honored version of what happened, who will be ready to disagree when, say, a Gordon Corrigan comes along with an opposing view and supportive facts. (This happens to be the case with those Court Historians who have written their glowing books/reviews of that Chateau/Donkey General Haig of WWI infamy).

If the British think Churchill was the man who won the war, he was also the man who, by his political actions between 1919 and 1929, by his unwillingness to trust professionals; by his unshakeable belief that he knew better than anyone else how his nation's efforts should be directed, was very nearly responsible for losing that war. Consider the author's excellent points: Churchill's conduct as First Lord of the Admiralty during the Norway campaign was disastrous; his demands to sink the French fleet at Mers el Kebir unnecessary; his insistence on sending troops to Greece when Britain was under no legal or moral obligation to do so; his constant harassment of Middle Eastern commanders to go on the offensive, when they knew they needed to wait; his insistence on an Italian campaign which then go so bogged down that it was neither a distraction from Normandy nor an enabler of a Balkan front...all dissipated what few assets Britain had and wasted lives to little avail.

This book adds much information to the discussion of the role of Churchill prior to, and during WWII. Highly recommended.