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Download Making Things Happen: A Theory of Causal Explanation (Oxford Studies in the Philosophy of Science) ePub

by James Woodward

Download Making Things Happen: A Theory of Causal Explanation (Oxford Studies in the Philosophy of Science) ePub
  • ISBN 0195189531
  • ISBN13 978-0195189537
  • Language English
  • Author James Woodward
  • Publisher Oxford University Press; 1 edition (October 27, 2005)
  • Pages 432
  • Formats lrf txt lrf azw
  • Category Math
  • Subcategory History and Philosophy
  • Size ePub 1247 kb
  • Size Fb2 1132 kb
  • Rating: 4.5
  • Votes: 952

In Making Things Happen, James Woodward develops a new and ambitious comprehensive theory of causation and explanation that draws on literature from a variety of disciplines and which applies to a wide variety of claims in science and everyday life. His theory is a manipulationist account, proposing that causal and explanatory relationships are relationships that are potentially exploitable for purposes of manipulation and control. This account has its roots in the commonsense idea that causes are means for bringing about effects; but it also draws on a long tradition of work in experimental design, econometrics, and statistics. Woodward shows how these ideas may be generalized to other areas of science from the social scientific and biomedical contexts for which they were originally designed. He also provides philosophical foundations for the manipulationist approach, drawing out its implications, comparing it with alternative approaches, and defending it from common criticisms. In doing so, he shows how the manipulationist account both illuminates important features of successful causal explanation in the natural and social sciences, and avoids the counterexamples and difficulties that infect alternative approaches, from the deductive-nomological model onwards.Making Things Happen will interest philosophers working in the philosophy of science, the philosophy of social science, and metaphysics, and as well as anyone interested in causation, explanation, and scientific methodology.

Making Things Happen contains an elaborate presentation and defense of Woodward's manipulability theory of causation and causal explanation, a powerful alternative to extant theories in the field.

Making Things Happen contains an elaborate presentation and defense of Woodward's manipulability theory of causation and causal explanation, a powerful alternative to extant theories in the field. an extremely important contribution to the debates about causation and explanation. It will become an indispensable reference for anyone who wants to work on these topics. Careful, detailed, often eloquent.

In Making Things Happen, James Woodward develops a new and ambitious comprehensive theory of causation .

In Making Things Happen, James Woodward develops a new and ambitious comprehensive theory of causation and explanation that draws on literature from a variety of disciplines and which applies to a wide variety of claims in science and everyday life. Making Things Happen will interest philosophers working in the philosophy of science, the philosophy of social science, and metaphysics, and as well as anyone interested in causation, explanation, and scientific methodology.

Making Things Happen: A Theory of Causal Explanation (Oxford Studies in the Philosophy of Science). Making Things Happen: A Theory of Causal Explanation (Oxford Studies in the Philosophy of Science).

This book develops a manipulationist theory of causation and explanation: causal and explanatory relationships are relationships that are potentially exploitable for purposes of manipulation and control

This book develops a manipulationist theory of causation and explanation: causal and explanatory relationships are relationships that are potentially exploitable for purposes of manipulation and control.

The book engages some of the relevant literature from other disciplines, as Woodward weaves together examples, counterexamples, criticisms, defenses, objections, and replies into a convincing defense of the core of his theory, which is that we can analyze causation by appeal to the notion of manipulation.

Causality: Philosophical Theory meets Scientific Practice. Oxford University Press. Spirtes, . Glymour, C. (1991).

Making Things Happen: A Theory of Causal Explanation. These divisions in philosophy are imperfectly correlated with a division in aims. Specically, the theory of Causal Bayes nets requires two axioms and two denitions for understanding the predic-tions of a wide class of causal hypotheses, and a third axiom for their dis-covery.

152. A Counterfactual Theory of Causal Explanation. 152.

Making Things Happen book. Start by marking Making Things Happen: A Theory of Causal Explanation (Oxford Studies in the Philosophy of Science) as Want to Read: Want to Read savin. ant to Read.

Talk about Making Things Happen: A Theory of Causal Explanation (Oxford Studies in the Philosophy of Science)


Nargas
I'm rating 5 stars because I don't want to hurt this books credibility. It's really a fantastic book with a thorough and convincing theory of manipulation based causation. I first encountered it in an ivy graduate school class, and later rediscovered it while working on a paper of my own. It's proven invaluable.

That said, the e-book formatting is awful. There are no chapter markings in the book. The commas used look like period, which makes reading difficult. There's basically not book metadata at all. It's like someone did a quick: scan -> OCR -> sell process on this. Very disappointed. Would love to see an updated copy that had proper e-book formatting.
Arlana
Woodward, a philosopher at Cal Tech, presents a detailed development and defense of an "interventionist" or "manipulability" theory of causation.

Major influences on Woodward include Spirtes, Glymour, and Scheines (1993/2000), who focus on causal inference and discovery from statistical data, and Judea Pearl (2000), who developed the notion of an intervention and showed how to estimate quantitative causal notions given qualitative notions of causal dependence. Woodward, by contrast, focuses on the semantic or interpretive project of understanding the basic qualitative causal notions (p. 38). Of all these writers, Woodward's concerns are most directly continuous with those of traditional philosophy of science.

Chapter 1 is an introduction and preview. Chapter 2 presents the guts of the manipulability theory. Here we get, among other things, a non-technical introduction to the use of acyclic directed graphs to represent causal relations. We also get solutions to a basketful of fascinating puzzle cases.

Chapter 3 expands on the notion of intervention that the theory needs. Since that notion is itself causal, the theory is non-reductive. The manipulability theory is contrasted with the closely related agency theory of causation, and also with David Lewis's counterfactual theory of causation.

Chapter 4 treats causal explanation, and includes a critique of the venerable Deductive-Nomological model of explanation. Chapter 5 develops a counterfactual theory of explanation, in which the complex antecedents of the relevant counterfactuals correspond to possible manipulations. There are also pragmatic or epistemic constraints on causal explanation that are not present in purely causal claims.

Chapter 6 deals with the notions of invariant relationships, lawfulness, exceptions, and ceteris paribus clauses in light of the manipulability theory. Chapter 7 interprets the structural equation models of biomedical and social science in light of the manipulability theory. Chapter 8 treats Wesley Salmon's causal-mechanical (causal process) model, and Philip Kitcher's unificationist model.

The painstaking detail of the treatment is admirable, if occasionally wearying. I am not a philosopher of science, but the work strikes me as lucid and penetrating throughout, in a way that recalls the philosophical virtues of classic writers like Carnap and Hempel.
Swiang
Excellent exposition of the interventionist theory of causation. Clear and well argued. An important contribution to the theory of causation and helpful for understanding the attendant philosophical issues.